In this paper, we examine the questions of which coalition structure is formed and how payoã is distributed among players in cooperative games with externalities. We introduce a sequential stability concept called a sequentially stable payoãconåguration in a game with a coalition structure by extending the concept of the equilibrium binding agreements by Ray and Vohra (1997) . Ray and Vohra capture explicitly the credibility of blocking coalitions, and then induce a recursive deånition of the stable coalition structures in a game with externalities. However, in their deånition, only breaking up is allowed for coalitions.
A sequential stable payoã conåguration is deåned as a payoã conågu-ration which sequentially dominates all other payoã conågurations.
As an application of this stable concept, we study a common pool resource game, where each payoãconåguration corresponds to one coalition structure. We show that if the number of players is between 3 and 48, then for some concave production function, the payoã conåguration related to the grand coalition structure is sequentially stable in the common pool resource game.
Introduction
In this paper, we examine the questions of which coalition structure is formed and how payoã is distributed among players in cooperative games with externalities. We introduce a sequential stability concept called a sequentially stable payoã conåguration in a game with a coalition structure by extending the concept of the equilibrium binding agreements by Ray and Vohra (1997) . Ray and Vohra capture explicitly the credibility of blocking coalitions, and then induce a recursive deånition of the stable coalition structures in a game with externalities. However, in their deånition, only breaking up is allowed for coalitions.
We propose a new concept of a sequential stable payoãconåguration such that coalitions can both break up and merge into. The payoãconåguration z is said to sequentially dominate the payoã conåguration z 0 if there is a sequence of payoã conågurations starting from z to z 0 such that (1) in each step, two coalitions may merge or one coalition may break into two coalitions, and (2) in each step, the members in the merging coalitions or the breaking coalition prefer the payoãs of the ånal conåguration z 0 to the present payoã. A sequential stable payoã conåguration is deåned as a payoã conåguration which sequentially dominates all other payoã conågurations.
As an application of this stable concept, we study a common pool resource game, where each payoã conåguration corresponds to one coalition structure. We show that if the number of players is between 3 and 48, then for some concave production function, the payoã conåguration related to the grand coalition structure is sequentially stable in the common pool resource game.
Dominations and Some Basic Concepts
Let N = f1; 2; :::; ng be a set of players. A subset S of N is called a coalition. First we deåne a set of feasible payoãvectors under a coalition structure. We use the concept of a coalition structure to describe the coalitions may form among individuals. Here a coalition structure P is a partition fS 1 ; S 2 ; :::; S k g of N , where S 1 ; S 2 ; :::; S k in P are pairwise disjoint and [ k j=1 S j = N: The set of partitions of N is denoted by Ö(N ).
The feasibility of the payoãdistributions among players depends on the coalition structure. Then the set of feasible payoã vectors under P is denoted by F (P) í IR n . We give an example of a set of feasible payoã vectors.
Example 1. A game in partition function form (N; v) is deåned by a pair of a set of pleyers N and a partition function v which assigns to each partition P 2 Ö(N ) each coalition S 2 P and a real value v(SjP). Given a game in partition function form, the set of feasible payoã vectors under P is fz 2 IR n j P i2S z i î v(SjP) 8S 2 Pg Example 2. A game in strategic form (N; fSg i2N ; ff i g i2N ) is deåned by a triple of a set of pleyers N , a set of strategies fS i g i2N and a payoã functionf i which assigns to each n-tuple of strategies (s 1 ; s 2 ; :::; s n ) 2 S 1 Ç S 2 Ç :::: Ç S n a payoã vector. We consider a mixed strategy and an expected payoã function. The mixed strategy of i is given by a probability distribution p i on S i . The expected payoã of player i for p = (p 1 ; p 2 ; :::; p n ) is denoted by E i (p).
Players in a colition T can choose their joint mixed strategy (p) T , which is given by a joint probability distribution on Ö i2T S i . The set of joint mixed strategies of T is given by Ö(T ).
Given a game in strategic form and a partition P, the set of feasible payoã vectors under P is fz 2 IR n jz i = E i (p 1 ; p 2 ; :::; p n ); (p i ) i2T 2 Ö(T ) for all T 2 Pg:
A pair (z; P) is called a payoã conåguration, where z = (z 1 ; z 2 ; :::; z n ) 2 F(P) is a feasible payoã vector and P is a coalition structure.
We introduce two special types of coalition structures. P N = fN g is called a grand coalition structure, and P I = ff1g; f2g; :::; fngg is called a singleton coalition structure or individual coalition structure. We also say that P 0 is a åner coalition structure of P (P is a coaser coalition structure of P 0 ), if the coalition structure P 0 is given by re-dividing the coalition structure P, that is, 8S 0 2 P 0 ; 9S 2 P such that S 0 í S and jP 0 j > jPj:
We introduce several stability concepts for a set of payoãconågurations. This is an alternative way to deåne a core of a game with externalities. For this purpose, we deåne two simple concepts of dominations between two payoã conågu-rations. Deånition 1. Let z 2 F(P) and z 0 2 F(P 0 ). We say that (z; P) is dominated by (y; P 0 ) if (1) P 0 is a åner coalition structure of P, and (2) there exists T 2 P 0 such that T 2 = P and y T > z T .
Deånition 2. Let z 2 F(P) and z 0 2 F(P 0 ). We say that (z; P) is directly dominated by (y; P 0 ) under P 0 if (3) P 0 is a åner coalition structure of P, and jP 0 j = jPj + 1, (4) there exists T 2 P 0 such that T 2 = P and y T > z T .
We can deåne stable payoãconågurations by these deånitions of dominations.
The following deånition is a natural extension of the credible core by Ray(1989) to games with externalities.
Deånition 3. A credible coalition structure is given as follows:
(1) P I = ff1g; f2g; :::; fngg is credible. (2) For k (k = n Ä 1; n Ä 2; :::; 1), P with jPj = k is credible if there exists z 2 F(P) such that (z; P) is not directly dominated by any payoã conåguration (z 0 ; P 0 ) where P 0 is credible and jPj = k Ä 1.
We call this (z; P) a credible payoã conåguration. Moreover, the set of all credible payoã conågurations is called a credible core, and is denoted by CC. This is a recursive deånition. First, acoording to (1), P I is credible. Second, we can check whether or not each of a coalition structure of (n Ä 1) coalitions is creadible by using the fact P I is credible. Third, we can check whether or not each of a coalition structure of (n Ä 2) coalitions is creadible by using the fact in the second step, and so on. Ray and Vohra (1997) extends the credible core concept by a diãerent way. Their concept is called \equilibrium binding aggrement". The following deånition of a modiåed credible coalition structure is the same as their concept properly, but it is expressed by a simpler way using a recursive deånition.
Deånition 4. A modiåed credible coalition structure is given as follows:
(1) P I = ff1g; f2g; :::; fngg is modiåed credible. (2') For k (k = n Ä 1; n Ä 2; :::; 1), P with jPj = k is modiåed credible if there exists z 2 F(P) such that (z; P) is not dominated by any payoã conåguration (z 0 ; P 0 ) where P 0 is modiåed credible and jP 0 j > k. We call this (z; P) a modiåed credible payoã conåguration. Moreover, the set of all modiåed credible payoãconågurations is called a modiåed credible core, and is denoted by MC.
The diãerence between the two deånitions is as follows: In a creadible coalition structure, only the (credible) direct domination, that is, a deviation of only one coalition is considered, but in a modiåed creadible coalition structure, every (credible) domination, that is, any deviaiton is considered.
Remark that a stability of coalition structures with respect to only deviaition of coalitions but not for merge of coalitions is considered in both deånitions.
Common Pool Resource Games
Here we apply two credible cores to an economy with externalities. Let the game of an economy with a common pool resource be described by a set of players N := f1; 2; : : : ; ng. For any player i 2 N , let x i ï 0 represent the amount of labour input of i. Clearly, the overall amount of labour is given by P j2N x j . The technology that determines the amount of product is considered to be a joint production function of the overall amount of labour f : IR + ! IR + satisfying f (0) = 0; lim x!1 f 0 (x) = 0; f 0 (x) > 0 and f 00 (x) < 0 for x > 0: The distribution of the product is supposed to be proportional to the amount of labour expended by players. In other words, the amount of the product assigned to player i is given by
The price of the product is normalized to be one unit of money and let q be a cost of labor per unit, and we suppose 0 < q < f 0 (0).
Then individual i's income is denoted by
Coalition S's total income is denoted by
where x S ë P i2S x i . We consider a game where each coalition is a player. It chooses its total labor input and its payoã is given by the sum of its members' incomes. Naturally we can deåne a Nash equilibrium of that game.
Proposition 1 (Funaki and Yamato(1999) ). For any P = fS 1 ; S 2 ; :::; S k g, there exists unique equilibrium (x
where
Given a coalition structure P = fS 1 ; :::; S k g, let (x É S 1 (P); :::; x É S k (P) be a unique equilibrium under P and let
(P); :::; x É S k (P)) be the equilibrium income of coalition S i for i = 1; ::; k and therefore m
The following result is given by Funaki and Yamato (1999) .
Proposition 2 (Funaki and Yamato(1999) ). For two coalition structures P k = fS 1 ; S 2 ; :::; S k g and P
Example 6. For a common pool resource game, the set of feasible payoã vectors F (P) is given by fz 2 Funaki and Yamato(1999) .
For a common pool resource game, we have another possibility to deåne the set of feasible payoã vectors as follows:
It is natural to consider this set because of the symmetry of players. We focus on this type of the set in this paper.
The following is an important lemma to obtain Theorems 1 and 2.
Lemma 1. In a common pool resource game, let a coalition structure P 6 = P I be given. Without loss of generality, denote the coalition structure by P = fS 1 ; S 2 ; :::; S k g , where S 1 = f1; 2; :::; rg, 2 î r î n, and 1 î k î n Ä r + 1.
Suppose that the coalition S 1 is divided into two subcoalitions, S 0 1 ëf1; ::;`g and S 00 1 ë f`+1; ::; rg, where 1 î`î r=2. All other players do not change their behavior in coalition formation. Denote this coalition structure P 0 = fS
2 ï`=r, in particular, if (i) r = n and n=`ï 4, (ii) 3 î r î n Ä 1 and =r î 4=9, or (iii) r = 2 and k ï 3.
Proof. By Proposition 1,
Therefore,
:
This condition is satisåed in the following cases. Case 1. r = n and n=`ï 4 Note that r = n if and only if k = 1. Hence,
Case 2. 3 î r î n Ä 1 and 4=9 ï`=r: Since r 6 = n, k ï 2. Also,
Case 3. r = 2 and k ï 3: Since r = 2,`= 1. Thus
We apply the credibility concepts to this common pool resource game.
Example 7. In a common pool resource game, suppose a production function f (x) is given by f (x) = p x. (1) When n = 4, the singleton coalition structure P I and all coalition structures consisting of two coalitions are both credible and modiåed credible.
(2) When n = 5, all coalition structures consisting of odd number of coalitions are credible. All coalition structures consisting of odd number of coalitions except for ffig; fjg; T g (jT j = 3) are modiåed credible.
(3) When n = 6, all coalition structures containing even number of coalitions are credible. Only the grand coalition structure P N , the singleton coalition structure P I , fQ; Rg (jQj = jRj = 3) and ffig; fjg; T; Ug (jT j = jU j = 2) are modiåed credible.
The following theorem shows that if the number of players is odd, then coalition structures consisting of odd numbers of coalitions are credible, in particular, the grand coalition structure is credible and a credible core allocation exists. If the number of players is even, then coalition structures consisting of even numbers of coalitions are credible. In this case, although the grand coalition structure is not credible, coalition structures consisting of (n-1) -person coalition and oneperson coalition are credible. This result is rather simple, but for the modiåed credibility, it is not easy to get a general result.
Theorem 1. In a common pool resource game, let n ï 4 and F (P) = fz 2
If n is odd, P consisting of odd number of coalitions is credible, and CC(P N ) 6 = ;. If n is even, P consisting of even number of coalitions is credible, and CC(P N ni ) 6 = ;. Here
Proof. Consider the case n ï 5 årst. According to the proof of Theorem 1, for the payoã vector z in F (P) with P 6 = P I , (z; P) is directly blocked by some T under some P'. Consider any coalition structure P such that jPj Ä 1 = jP I j and P I is åner than P. Since P I is credible by deånition, the above result implies that (z; P) is directly blocked by åner credible coalition structure P I . This means that P is not credible.. The set of such P is denoted by P 2 . That is, P 2 = fPjjPj Ä 1 = jP I j and P I is åner than Pg:
By a simple consideration, we have P 2 = fPjjPj = n Ä 1g. The above result directly implies that any P 0 2 P 3 is credible because any P 2 P 2 is not credible, where
This consideration implies that any P 2 P m is credible if m = n Ä 2k(k = 0; 1; 2; :::), and not credible if m = n Ä 2k Ä 1(k = 0; 1; 2; :::; ). Since m = n Ä 2k is odd if n is odd, P consisting of odd number of coalitions is credible, and P N 2 P n is credible, that is, CC(P N ) 6 = ;. Since m = n Ä 2k is even if n is even, P consisting of even number of coalitions is credible, and
For the case n = 4, put r = 2 and k = 3 in Lemma 1. This implies P 2 P 2 is not credible because P I is credible. Then P 2 P 3 is credible. Put r = 3 and`= 1 in Lemma 1. This implies P 2 P 4 is not credible because P 2 P 3 is credible.
Q.E.D.
Unfortunately we cannot ånd a general property of a modiåed credible core of a common pool resorce game.
Example 8. In a common pool resource game, let f (x) = x ã , and let n = 8. When ã = 0:2; 0:5; 0:8, the grand coalition structure P N is both credible and modiåed credible. When ã = 0:001; 0:9; 0:995, the grand coalition structure P N is not modiåed credible but credible.
In both deånitions of credible cores and modiåed credible cores, only breaking up is allowed for coalitions. In the next section, we propose another new concept of stability of payoã conågurations such that coalitions can both break up and merge into.
Sequentially Stable Coalition Structure
In this section, we give a main concept of our solution called \Sequentially Stable Payoã Conåguration" and apply this concept to the game with a common pool resource.
Deånition 6. Let z 2 F(P) and y 2 F(P 0 ). We say that (z; P) sequentially dominates (y; P 0 ) if there is a sequence of payoãconågurations f(x t ; P t )g T t=0 with x t 2 F(P t ) such that (1) P T = P, P 0 = P 0 , x 0 = y and x q = z, and (2) for all t (0 î t î T Ä1), either P t is a åner coalition structure of P t+1 with jP t j = jP t+1 j + 1, or P t+1 is a åner coalition structure of P t with jP t+1 j = jP t j + 1, and (3) for all t (0 î t î T Ä 1), for some S 2 P t+1 with S 2 =P t ,
We also use a term domination and sequential domination for coalition structures when only one payoãvector is feasible under each coalition structure. That is, if (z É ; P É ) (sequentially) dominates (z; P N ), then we simply say that P É (sequentially) dominates P N , and we use the following notation;
The condition (3) shows that if P k is a åner coalition structure of P k+1 , for any member of two combining coalitions S and T such that S; T 2 P k and S [ T 2 P k+1 , his payoã x k i is smaller than his terminal payoã x q i , and if P k+1 is a åner coalition structure of P k , for any member of one of the divided two coalitions S and T such that S; T 2 P k+1 and S [ T 2 P k , his payoãx k i is smaller than his terminal payoã x q i .
Deånition 7. Let z 2 F(P É ). We say that (z; P É ) is a sequentially stable payoã conåguration if for all feasible payoã conågurations (y; P) with P 6 = P É , (z; P É ) sequentially dominates (y; P).
The following lemma gives a nesessary and suécient condition that the payoã conågration in the grand coalition structure is prefarable to the payoã conågu-ration in another coalition structure for all players.
Lemma 2. In a common pool resource game, let a coalition structure P be given. Without loss of generality, denote the coalition structure by P = fS 1 ; S 2 ; S 3 ; :::; S k g, where jS 1 j = r 1 î jS 2 j = r 2 î jS 3 j = r 3 î ::: î jS k j = r k . Let
where P N = f1; 2; ::; ng is the grand coalition structure. Then for each i 2 N , m
for i 2 S j and j = 1; :::; k. Notice that for the grand coalition structure P N , k = 1 and r 1 = n, so that m
We also remark that a player belonging to the smallest coalition, S 1 , obtains the highest payoã among all players, that is, the payoã of each player i, m É i (P), is less than or equal to m
If we apply this lemma to a common pool resource game with a production function f (x) = x ã (0 < ã< 1); we have the followings: By Proposition 1, for any P
Notice that if P = P N , then k = 1 and r = n, so that
This implies
We check the sequential stability of the grand coalition structure. First consider a case n = 2 m . We say P is a k-th stage coalition structure if jPj = k.
Theorem 2. If B(k) < 1=2
kÄ1 for all k(k = 2; :::; m; m + 1), the grand coalition structure is sequentially stable.
Proof. We have to show that every coalition structure other than the grand coalition structure P N is sequentially dominated by P N . In the following, we denote a coalition structure P = fS 1 ; S 2 ; S 3 ; :::; S k g, where jS 1 j = r 1 î jS 2 j = r 2 î jS 3 j = r 3 î ::: î jS k j = r k , by fr 1 ; r 2 ; r 3 ; :::; r k g, because the payoã is determined by the sizes of all cotillions in a coalition structure.
Consider a coalition structure P É consisting of the following (m+1) coalitions: two 1-person coalitions, one 2-person coalition, one 4-person coalition, one 8-person coalition, ..., and one 2 mÄ1 -person coalition. This coalition structure is denoted by f1; 1; 2; 4; 8; ::::; 2 mÄ1 g.
The proof consists of four steps. (Step 1) P É is sequentially dominated by P N : Consider a sequence of coalition structures fP t g m t=0 such that P 0 = P É ; P m = P N , and the two coalitions of the smallest size in P t merge in P t+1 for t = 0; 1; 2; :::; m Ä 1. This sequence is expressed by P 0 = P É = f1; 1; 2; 4; 8; :::; 2 mÄ2 ; 2 mÄ1 g ! P 1 = f2; 2; 4; 8; :::; 2 mÄ2 ; 2 mÄ1 g ! P 2 = f4; 4; 8; :::; 2 mÄ2 ; 2 mÄ1 g ! :::: ! :::: ! P mÄ2 = f2 mÄ2 ; 2 mÄ2 ; 2 mÄ1 g ! P mÄ1 = f2 mÄ1 ; 2 mÄ1 g ! P m = P N = f2 m g First, it follows from Lemma 2 that the 2nd stage coalition structure P mÄ1 = f2 mÄ1 ; 2 mÄ1 g is dominated by P N , since r 1 =n = 2 mÄ1 =2 m = 1=2 > B(2) by the hypothesis.
Next, it follows from Lemma 1 that the 3rd stage coalition structure P mÄ2 = f2 mÄ2 ; 2 mÄ2 ; 2 mÄ1 g is dominated by P N , since r 1 =n = 2 mÄ2 =2 m = 1=4 > B(3) by the hypothesis.
In general, for k = 2; :::; m; m + 1, it follows from Lemma 2 that the k-th stage coalition structure P mÄk+1 = f2 mÄk+1 ; 2 mÄk+1 ; 2 mÄk+2 ; 2 mÄk+3 ; :::; 2 mÄ1 g is sequentially dominated by P N , since r 1 =n = 2 mÄk+1 =2 m = 1=2 kÄ1 > B(k) by the hypothesis.
Therefore, the (m+1)-th stage coalition structure P 0 = P É = f1; 1; 2; 4; :::; 2 mÄ1 g is sequentially dominated by P N . (Step 2) Every (m + 1)-th stage coalition structure is sequentially dominated by P N : Take any (m + 1)-stage coalition structure P. First we consider a sequence fP t g T t=0 such that 1) P 0 = P = fr 1 ; r 2 ; r 3 ; :::; r mÄ1 ; r m ; r m+1 g 2) P T = f1; 1; 1; :::; 1; 2 m Ä mg, where jP T j = m + 1. 3) If t is zero or even, then the largest and the second largest coalitions in P t merge in P t+1 . 4) If t is odd, then one person belonging to the largest coalition in P t deviates and forms one person coalition in P t+1 .
Then the sequence fP t g T t=0 of coalition structures is given by: t=T such that 1) P T = f1; 1; 1; :::; 1; 2 m Ä mg, 2) P T +T 0 = P É = f1; 1; 2; 4; 8; :::; 2 mÄ2 ; 2 mÄ1 g, 3) If t = T + ïand ïis zero or even (ïî T 0 Ä 2), then the smallest coalition of more than one members and a 1-person coalition in P T +ï merge in P T +ï+1 .
4) If t = T + ïand ïis odd (ïî
persons in the coalition of 2
) persons in P T +ï deviate and form a coalition in P T +ï+1 . Note that 2
t=T of coalition structures is given by: P T = f1; 1; 1; 1; :::; 1; 1; 1; 1; 2 m Ä mg ((m + 1)-th stage)
! P T +1 = f1; 1; 1; 1; :::; 1; 1; 1; 2 m Ä m + 1g (m-th stage)
! P T +2 = f1; 1; 1; 1; :::; 1; 1; 1; 2 m Ä m + 1 Ä 2 mÄ1 ; 2 mÄ1 g = f1; 1; 1; 1; :::; 1; 1; 1; 2 mÄ1 Äm+1; 2 mÄ1 g ((m+1)-th stage)
! P T +3 = f1; 1; 1; 1; :::; 1; 1; 2 mÄ1 Ä m + 2; 2 mÄ1 g (m-th stage)
! P T +4 = f1; 1; 1; 1; :::; 1; 1; 2 mÄ1 Ä m + 2 Ä 2 mÄ2 ; 2 mÄ2 ; 2 mÄ1 g = f1; 1; 1; 1; :::; 1; 1; 2 mÄ2 Äm+2; 2 mÄ2 ; 2 mÄ1 g ( (m+1) and a sequence from P T +T 0 = P É to P N , every coalition structure in the sequence fP t g
is sequentially dominated by P N . And so is the (m + 1)-th stage coalition structure P. This completes the proof of Step 2. (Step 3) Every coalition structure P of less than m + 1 coalitions other than the grand coalition structure P N is sequentially dominated by P N .
First, we show that each member of a coalition of the maximal size in any coaltion structure P prefers her payoã under P N to her payoã under P. Denote P by P = fS 1 ; S 2 ; S 3 ; :::; S k g, where jS 1 j = r 1 î jS 2 j = r 2 î jS 3 j = r 3 î :::
kÄ1 , it follows that r k =n ï 1=k ï 1=2 kÄ1 > B(k). By Lemma 1, we have the desired result.
Take any coalition structure P of less than m + 1 coalitions other than P N . Consider the following sequence fP t g starting from P to some (m + 1)-stage coalition structure P 0 : one person in a coalition of the maximial size in P t deviates and forms a 1-person coalition in P t+1 . Notice that such a person in P t prefers her payoãunder P N to her payoãunder P t , as shown above. Moreover, it is easy to construct a sequence of coalition structures from P to P N by combining the above sequence from P to P 0 and the sequence from P 0 to P N in Step 2. These imply that P is sequentially dominated by P N .
(Step 4) Every coalition structure P of more than m+1 coalitions is sequentially dominated by P N . Take any k-th stage coalition structure P of more than m+1 coalitions. Since B(k) is a decreasing function by Lemma 2, B(k) < B(m + 1) < 1=2 m = 1=n î r i =n holds for any r i ï 1. This together with Lemma 1 imply that each member of any coalition in P prefers her payoã under the grand coalition structure P N to her payoã under P.
Consider a sequence fP t g starting from P to some (m + 1)-stage coalition structure P 0 such that two coalitions in P t merge and form one coalition in P t+1 . Notice that each member in these two coalitions in P t prefers her payoã under P N to her payoã under P t , as shown above. Moreover, it is easy to construct a sequence of coalition structures from P to P N by combining the above sequence from P to P 0 and the sequence from P 0 to P N in Step 2. These imply that P is sequentially dominated by P N . Q.E.D.
Next consider a case that n = 2 m + l (1 î l î 2 m Ä 1).
Theorem 3. If B(k) < 2 mÄ k+1 n (k = 2; :::; m; m+1),the grand coalition structure is sequentially stable.
Proof. The basic idea of the proof is the same as that of the proof of Theorem 3. Consider a coalition structure P É = f1; 1; 2; 4; 8; ::::; 2 mÄ2 ; 2 mÄ1 + lg consisting of (m + 1) coalitions. (Step 1) P É is sequentially dominated by P N . Consider a sequence of coalition structures fP t g m t=0 such that P 0 = P É ; P m = P N , and the two coalitions of the smallest size in P t merge in P t+1 for t = 0; 1; 2; :::; m Ä 1. This sequence is expressed by P É = f1; 1; 2; 4; 8; :::; 2 mÄ2 ; 2 mÄ1 + lg ! f2; 2; 4; 8; :::; 2 mÄ2 ; 2 mÄ1 + lg ! f4; 4; 8; :::; 2 mÄ2 ; 2 mÄ1 + lg ! ::::
First, it follows from Lemma 1 that the 2nd stage coalition structure P mÄ1 = f2 mÄ1 ; 2 mÄ1 + lg is dominated by P N , since r 1 =n = 2 mÄ1 =n > B(2) by the hypothesis.
Next, it follows from Lemma 1 that the 3rd stage coalition structure P mÄ2 = f2 mÄ2 ; 2 mÄ2 ; 2 mÄ1 + lg is dominated by P N , since r 1 =n = 2 mÄ2 =n > B(3) by the hypothesis.
In general, for k = 2; :::; m; m + 1, it follows from Lemma 1 that the k-th stage coalition structure P mÄk+1 = f2 mÄk+1 ; 2 mÄk+1 ; 2 mÄk+2 ; 2 mÄk+3 ; :::; 2 mÄ1 + lg is sequentially dominated by P N , since r 1 =n = 2 mÄk+1 =n > B(k) by the hypothesis. Therefore the (m+1)-th stage coalition structure P 0 = P É = f1; 1; 2; 4; :::; 2 mÄ1 + lg is sequentially dominated by P N . We omit the rest of the proof that is similar to that of Proposition 3. Q.E.D. Proof. The important diãerence from Theorem 4 is that one person coalition in (m + 1)-th stage coalition stracture does not like to move to P N , but members in coalitions with two or more players like to move to the destination coalition structure P N . We follow the procedures of the proof of Theorems 3 and 4. Consider a coalition structure P ÉÉ = f1; 1; 2; 2; 2; 8; ::::; 2 mÄ2 ; 2 mÄ1 + lg consisting of (m + 2) coalitions instead of P É = f1; 1; 2; 4; 8; :::; 2 mÄ1 +lg in Theorems 3 and 4.
(Step 1) P ÉÉ is sequentially dominated by P N . Consider a sequence of coalition structures fP t g m+1 t=0 such that P 0 = P ÉÉ ; P m+1 = P N , P ÉÉ = f1; 1; 2; 2; 2; 8; :::; 2 mÄ2 ; 2 mÄ1 + lg ! P 1 = f2; 2; 2; 2; 8; :::; 2 mÄ2 ; 2 mÄ1 + lg ((m + 1)-th stage)
! P 2 = f2; 2; 4; 8; :::; 2 mÄ2 ; 2 mÄ1 + lg (m-th stage)
! P 3 = f4; 4; 8; :::; 2 mÄ2 ; 2 mÄ1 + lg ((m Ä 1)-th stage) ! :::: ! ::::
We can prove that P m = f2 mÄ1 ; 2 mÄ1 + lg, P mÄ1 = f2 mÄ2 ; 2 mÄ2 ; 2 mÄ1 + lg ,..., and P 2 = f2; 2; 4; 8; :::; 2 mÄ2 ; 2 mÄ1 + lg are sequentially dominated by P N by the same argument as Step 1 in the proof of Theorem 4. Also, it follows from Lemma 1 that P 1 = f2; 2; 2; 2; 8; :::; 2 mÄ2 ; 2 mÄ1 + lg is dominated by P N , since r 1 =n = 2=n > B(m + 1) which is obtained from 2=n > B(m) by the hypothesis and B(m) > B(m + 1).
Moreover, it follows from Lemma 1 that P 0 = P ÉÉ = f1; 1; 2; 2; 2; 8; :::; 2 mÄ2 ; 2 mÄ1 + lg is dominated by P N , since r 1 =n = 1=n > B(m + 2) by the hypothesis. Therefore P ÉÉ = f1; 1; 2; 2; 2; 8; :::; 2 mÄ1 + lg is sequentially dominated by P N .
(
Step 2) Every (m + 1)-th stage coalition structure is sequentially dominated by P N : Take any (m + 1)-stage coalition structure P. First we consider a sequence fP t g T t=0 such that 1) P 0 = P = fr 1 ; r 2 ; r 3 ; :::; r mÄ1 ; r m ; r m+1 g 2) P T = f1; 1; 1; :::; 1; 2 m + l Ä mg, where jP T j = m + 1. 3) If t is zero or even, then one person belonging to the largest coalition in P t deviates and forms one person coalition in P t+1 . 4) If t is odd, then the largest and the second largest coalitions in P t merge in P t+1 .
Then the sequence fP t g T t=0 of coalition structures is given by:
P 0 = fr 1 ; r 2 ; r 3 ; :::; r mÄ1 ; r m ; r m+1 g ((m + 1)-th stage)
! P 1 = f1; r 1 ; r 2 ; r 3 ; :::; r mÄ1 ; r m ; r m+1 Ä 1g ((m + 2)-th stage)
! P 2 = f1; r 1 ; r 2 ; r 3 ; :::; r mÄ1 ; r m + r m+1 Ä 1g ((m + 1)-th stage)
! P 3 = f1; 1; r 1 ; r 2 ; r 3 ; :::; r mÄ1 ; r m +r m+1 Ä2g ( (m+2 t=T such that 1) P T = f1; 1; 1; :::; 1; 2 m + l Ä mg, 2) P T +T 0 = P ÉÉ = f1; 1; 2; 2; 2; 8; :::; 2 mÄ2 ; 2 mÄ1 + lg. 3) If t = 0, 2 mÄ1 Ä m persons in the coalition of 2 m + l Ä m persons in P 0 deviate and form a coalition in P 1 .
4) If t = T + ïand ïis odd (ïî T 0 Ä 3), then the smallest coalition of more than one members and a 1-person coalition in P T +ï merge in P T +ï+1 .
5) If
This sequence fP t g
t=T of coalition structures is given by: t=T , we can get a sequence fP t g T +T 0 t=0 from any (m+1)-th stage coalition structure P to P ÉÉ . Note that only deviation of a coalition with 2 or more members appeares for all (m + 1)-th coalition structures in this sequence.
The rest part of the proof is the same as the proof of Theorem 4. Q.E.D.
Theorem 5. If f (x) = x ã and either 3 î n î 48, then for some ã, the grand coalition structure P N is sequentially stable in the common pool game.
Proof. Note that B(k) is an increasing function of ã, and lim ã!0 B(k) = 1=k 2 for any k. Hence for suéciently small ã > 0, B(k) is very close to 1=k 2 . First of all, consider the case of n = 2 m . In this case, it follows from Theorem 2 that for m î 5, that is, for n = 4; 8; 16; 32, P N is sequentially stable for a suéciently small ã, since lim ã!0 B(k) = 1=k 2 < 1=2 kÄ1 for k = 2; 3; 4; 5; 6: lim ã!0 B(2) = 1=4 < 1=2, lim ã!0 B(3) = 1=9 < 1=2 2 = 1=4, lim ã!0 B(4) = 1=16 < 1=2 3 = 1=8, lim ã!0 B(5) = 1=25 < 1=2 4 = 1=16, and lim ã!0 B(6) = 1=36 < 1=2 5 = 1=32. Next consider the case of n = 2 m +l (1 î l î 2 m Ä1). There are åve subcases to examine: = 1=n, it follows from Theorem 3 that P N is sequentially stable for a suéciently small ã if 32 î n î 35.
On the other hand, when lim ã!0 B(6) > 1=n, if lim ã!0 B(7) = 1=49 < 1=n, that is, n 2 f36; 37; :::; 48g, it follows from Theorem 4 that P N is sequentially stable for a suéciently small ã if 32 î n î 48.
Linear Public Goods Games
There are n players and let N = f1; 2; ::; ng (n ï 2) be the set of players. Each player i 2 N has one unit of initial endowment of a private good, and she faces a decision of splitting it between her contribution to a public good, x i 2 [0; 1], and her own consumption of the private good, 1 Ä x i . The level of the public good is the sum of the contributions of n players, P j2N x j . Player i's payoã under the contribution vector (x 1 ; :::; x n ) is given by u i (x 1 ; :::; x n ) = a( P j2N x j )+(1Äx i ) = (aÄ1)x i +1+a P j6 =i x j . Here we suppose 1 > a > Theorem 6. Let a 2 ( 1 n ; 1) be given. The coalition structure P = fS 1 ; S 2 ; ::; S k g is both credible and modiåed credible if max j2f1;::;kg jS j j = s É (a).
Proof : Take any coalition structure P = fS 1 ; S 2 ; ::; S k g such that max j2f1;::;kg jS (P)) = a jBj + 1. Consider any P 0 that is åner than P. There are two cases to examine: Case 1: There are S j 2 P and T 1 ; ::; T`2 P 0 such that jS j j = s É (a) and [ j=1;::;`Tj = S j .
In this case, since jT j j < s 
Remark. Theorem 6 holds for P = P 1 [ P 2 , where jS p j ï s É 8S p 2 P 1 , P S p 2P 1 jS p j = rs É ; (0 î r î k), and jS q j < s É 8S q 2 P 2 .
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